Tuesday, December 6, 2016

Conference on Economic Design: York, United Kingdom, June 14-16, 2017

2017 Conference on Economic Design: York, United Kingdom, June 14-16, 2017

The tenth bi-annual Conference on Economic Design will be held at the University of York, United Kingdom, on three full days June 14-16 (Wed--Fri), 2017.
It will be organised by the Economics Department of the University of York and the Centre for Mechanism and Institution Design.


The conference welcomes paper submissions from many different fields such as economics, business, finance, politics, computer science, operations research, law, history relevant to mechanism or institution design in a broad sense, regardless of whether contributions are theoretical, empirical, experimental, historical or practical. Subjects include but are not limited to auctions, matching, school choice, college admission, organ exchange, decentralised markets, random market mechanisms, voting, social choice, taxation, tax reform, coalition formation, price formation, ranking and scoring, measurements of power and influence, contest, fair division, contract, bargaining, negotiation, market design implementation, pricing on electricity, pricing on public utilities, pricing on cloud computing services, online allocation mechanisms, online auctions, market design experiments, public goods experiments, behavioural mechanism design, information and incentive, digital sport market for labour, market design in transportation sector, institution and organisation, health care, health policy, health insurance, pension scheme, fiscal policy, monetary policy, growth and development, performance evaluation, arbitration, patent design, governance, etc.
York is a beautiful historical city with a rich heritage and a wealth of attractions being one of the most popular tourist destinations in the UK. We would like to advise you to make a hotel reservation as soon as possible if you wish to attend the conference, in order to avoid a shortage of affordable accommodation.

The Keynote Speakers are:
Sanjeev Goyal (Cambridge)

Parag Pathak (MIT)

Philip Reny (Chicago)


    Important Dates:
    Paper Submission Opens: 20-Nov-2016

    Paper Submission Deadline: 16-Feb-2017

    Notice of Accepted Papers : 1-Mar-2017 until 6-Apr-2017

    Registration Opens: 10-Mar-2017

    Early Registration Deadline: 20-Apr-2017

    Registration Deadline: 20-May-2017


      Conference Fees:
      Regular participants: Until 20-Apr-2017: £330 (GBP), after 20-Apr-2017: £380 (GBP)

      Student participants: Until 20-Apr-2017: £190 (GBP), after 20-Apr-2017: £230 (GBP)

      (Fees include a gala dinner, 3 lunches, drinks, a two-year membership of the Society for Economic Design and a subscription to the Review of Economic Design.)

      Paper Submission:
      We start to accept paper submissions from 20th Noverber 2016 until 16th February 2017.
      Each individual is allowed for only one paper submission.
      Papers should be submitted in PDF with a cover letter to CED2017york@gmail.com.
      If the author is a student, it is advised to declare it.

      Monday, December 5, 2016

      The human side of kidney exchange: video from NAS (5 minutes)

      This short (5 min) video is the first in a series From Research To Reward  by the National Academy of Sciences about the human side of the benefits from science.  It mostly follows a married, incompatible pair through their kidney exchange transplants, as part of a chain organized by the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD).
      This film is the first part of the series  
      "The Matchmaker: An Economist Tackles Kidney Exchange from The Academies on Vimeo.
      "When Fielding Daniel and his wife Amy discovered that it would take five years for him to to be matched with a kidney donor, they were devastated. They launched a desperate search for a life-saving solution that led them to an unexpected savior - a market economist [then] at Harvard University.
      Learn more at www.nasonline.org/r2r.

      "This short film is the first in the series From Research To Reward which examines the impact of social science research on our lives. It was created by Redglass Pictures for The National Academy of Sciences.

      "A film by Sarah Klein and Tom Mason
      Director of Photography Jon Kasbe
      Music by  Ryan Sayward Whittier
      Motion Graphics by  Kathleen Chee
      Special thanks to: Dr. Alvin Roth. Amy and Fielding Daniel, Nobel Media, Dr. Michael Rees"
      ********************

      The video has an animated artist's impression of the 2004 paper "Kidney Exchange" by Roth, Sonmez and Unver in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.

      It also has a shout out to Susan Rees, the transplant coordinator at the APD. I've written before about the importance of the nurses and social workers who act as transplant coordinators.

      You can also link to the video at
      http://www.redglasspictures.com/the-matchmaker-1/

      http://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/509054/harvard-economist-redesigned-kidney-marketplace/

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TJio37Fo0BQ

      http://www.nasonline.org/publications/from-research-to-reward/

      That last link also has a previously published companion story that I blogged about earlier:
      A NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES SERIES
      ABOUT SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY AND HUMAN BENEFIT
      Matching Kidney Donors with Those Who Need Them—and Other Explorations in Economics

      The chain in which the Daniels participated was featured on the front page of the December 25, 2011 issue of Parade magazine and was started by non-directed donor Deb Shearer.

      Here's that story: The Miracle of Life: How One Woman Turned Tragedy into the Ultimate Gift


      For kidney exchange history buffs, here's my 2009 post about of the first, pioneering non-simultaneous kidney exchange chain, organized by Dr Mike Rees, who founded the APD: the original paper is here, in the NEJM: Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, and Robert A. Montgomery, “A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” New England Journal of Medicine, 360;11, March 12, 2009

      Sunday, December 4, 2016

      Matching in Budapest, Dec 14-15

      101 years of matching in Hungary will be the subject of two matching conferences are coming up in Budapest.
      On Dec 14, 100 years of matching theory in Hungary.  Here is the conference program.

      And on Dec 15:
      Programme  (also here)
      8:30-9:00Registration
      9:00-10:00Keynote presentation: Utku Unver (Boston College)
      Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange
      10:00-10:30Coffee break
      10:30-12:30Session 1
      First Choice-Maximizing School Choice Mechanisms, by Timo Mennle (University of Zurich)
      School Choice with Voucher, by Mustafa Afacan (Sabanci University)
      Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence, by Rustam Hakimov (WZB Berlin)
      12:30-14:00Lunch
      14:00-15:00Session 2
      Testing different cardinal matching mechanisms in the field, by  Alexander Nesterov (Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg)
      Hungarian secondary school and higher education admissions data in the Databank, by Zoltán Hermann (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
      15:00-16:00Policy roundtable: Course allocation
      Estelle Cantillon (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and Utku Unver (Boston College)
      16:00-16:30Coffee break
      16:30-18:30Session 3
      Team Formation as an Incentive Device, by Xiaocheng Hu (University of Southampton)
      Assignment maximisation, by Inacio Bo (WZB Berlin)
      Refugee resettlement, by Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford)
      ******************
      In November, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences also hosted a
      Workshop on Future Directions in Computational Social Choice, which contained papers on stable matching by Ágnes Cseh: Popular Matchings and Zsuzsanna Jankó: Various Stable Matching Concepts.

      Friday, December 2, 2016

      New Zealand's new Compensation for Live Organ Donors Bill

      Here's the link to the new New Zealand legislation on removing disincentives from kidney donation, sent by  Frank McCormick.

      Compensation for Live Organ Donors Bill (formerly titled Financial Assistance for Live Organ Donors Bill)
      3.Purpose
      The purpose of this Act is to remove a financial deterrent to the donation of organs by live donors.

      ...
      9Who are qualifying donors
      (1)
      A person is a qualifying donor in relation to a donor surgery if, on application under Part 3, the Director-General is satisfied that—
      (a)
      the person will forgo earnings as a result of taking unpaid leave or otherwise ceasing employment to allow for his or her recuperation from the surgery; and
      (b)
      both the donor surgery and the surgery to implant the organ will be carried out in New Zealand; and
      (c)
      the recipient of the organ is eligible to receive services funded under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000; and
      (d)
      the organ will be collected, implanted, and dealt with lawfully.
      (2)
      For the purposes of subsection (1)(d), the Director-General may assume the organ will be collected, implanted, and dealt with lawfully in the absence of information to the contrary.

      Entitlement to earnings compensation while recuperating

      10Qualifying donors entitled to earnings compensation for up to 12 weeks while recuperating

      ******

      Thursday, December 1, 2016

      Public lecture at Rice University, Dec 2

      I'll be giving the RISE Lecture at Rice (RISE = The Rice Initiative for the Study of Economics).

      Here are some other links with logistics (the event is free, but they want to know who is coming...):
      http://news.rice.edu/2016/11/21/nobel-laureate-alvin-roth-to-discuss-the-new-economics-of-matchmaking-and-market-design-dec-2/

      https://www.eventbrite.com/e/rice-university-presents-nobel-laureate-alvin-roth-tickets-29130669617

      Wednesday, November 30, 2016

      Removing financial dis-incentives from kidney donation in New Zealand

      Frank McCormick points out this encouraging story from New Zealand, about removing financial disincentives from donating a kidney:

      'Recognising the heroes' - MP's bill will give organ donors full compo while they recover

      "Mr Bishop has steered a Member's Bill into law that will pay donors 100 per cent of their income for up to eight weeks plus childcare costs if needed.

      In 2015 there were 78 live donors who donated a kidney or part of their liver, and "while the rate of live and deceased donors is slowly increasing, New Zealand still has one of the lowest organ donation rates in the world.

      "The evidence is pretty clear that financial barriers is one thing that people do think about," Mr Bishop said."